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In this paper we analyze exemplarily the volatility of the internal rates
of return of the German pension system over the life-cycle of an indi-
vidual born in 1957. The outcome is compared to an alternative deﬁned-
contribution or deﬁned-beneﬁt policy. Based on the actual data, our results
show the volatility of the internal rate of return to be signiﬁcantly higher
under the actual policy. We furthermore ﬁnd that the sustainable internal
rates of return are close to zero for the youngest male cohorts and posi-
tive for females for optimistic growth scenarios. In more realistic scenarios
things turn worse.
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In the past, the German pension system has been exposed to numerous policy
interventions: From today’s perspective dynamic pension policy for employees
and workers was ﬁrstly introduced by the pension reform of 1957. The latest con-
siderable change was applied in 2005 aiming to cope with demographic transition
in Germany.
As both the “ﬁrst” and the “latest” reform have and had huge eﬀects on
the public pension level and the contribution payments, this naturally obtrudes
the question to what extent all the reforms and adjustments within this period
aﬀected the pension level and the contribution rate. More precisely, what do
these changes mean for an individual “exposed” to the German pension system
in terms of riskiness. We develop scenarios, namely deﬁned-contribution and
deﬁned-beneﬁt rules, for benchmarking and thus comparing the actual policy to
them.
Our paper relates to the literature of political risk aspects of social security
systems. For example McHale (2001) and Borgmann and Heidler (2003) deﬁne
political risk as the risk of changes in the social security beneﬁt rule. These alter-
ations to the beneﬁt rule obviously constitute a source of risk for the individuals’
life-cycle resources. In contrast to this, B¨ orsch-Supan (2005) points out a more
narrow perspective of political risk. He outlines political risk conditional on the
circumstances (i.e. demographic development or uncertainty in future growth
rates) that lead policy makers to their decisions.
In contrast to this, the type of risk we want to take into consideration is
based on the perspective of an individual, that is myopic to adjustment pro-
cesses: Observing the available data of the German pension system – revenues
and expenditures –, the individual projects all future payments from his point of
view. The signiﬁcant diﬀerence is that the above mentioned political risk deﬁned
by McHale and B¨ orsch-Supan is exclusively induced by the policy maker. In our
approach we still analyze riskiness due to legal changes but as well as due to reac-
tions of individuals, who take these policy interventions for granted. Finally, we
can regard for demography-induced volatility by benchmarking the actual policy
with the deﬁned-contribution or deﬁned-beneﬁt scenario.
To quantify the risk as deﬁned here, we calculate diﬀerent internal rates of
return over the life-cycle of an individual. For this purpose, we use a modiﬁcationof the method of generational accounting.1 Using this method with present data
of the German pension system, Raﬀelh¨ uschen (1998) was the ﬁrst to calculate
sustainable rates of return. In this respect we now want to go further by intro-
ducing historical data in order to calculate sustainable rates of return as well as
unadjusted internal rates of return. The ﬁrst measure considers all adjustments
for balancing the annual budget of the German pension system realized at the
end of the individual’s life-cycle. In contrast to this the unadjusted internal rates
of return depict the development over the life-cycle of a cohort.
The ﬁndings of the paper are twofold: First, we calculate sustainable internal
rates of return based on the actual pension policy and show that they are close
below zero for male cohorts born after the year 2000 and positive for females for
optimistic growth scenarios. Second, we demonstrate that the rates of return of
the German pension system – computed by the myopic individual over his life-
cycle – are highly volatile for the middle-aged cohort of 1957. This volatility of
internal rates of return is lower under the deﬁned-contribution or deﬁned-beneﬁt
scenario compared to the actual policy. Furthermore the resulting sustainable
rates of return are higher are higher for all cohorts born after 1990 under the
alternative adjustment rules than those resulting from the actual policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the method of projecting
and adjusting per capita revenues and expenditures. Furthermore, it shows how
internal rates of return are calculated. It closes with a discussion of the type of
riskiness introduced here. Section 3 presents the underlying data and results; ﬁrst
of all the sustainable rates of return for diﬀerent cohorts. Secondly we depict the
volatility for the internal rates of return over the life-cycle. Section 3 closes with
a comparison of sustainable internal rates of return of the youngest and future
cohorts under the diﬀerent policies Section 4 summarizes and concludes.
2 Method
2.1 Projecting net beneﬁts
As mentioned above we want to compute internal rates of return, which base on
actual payment as well as hypothetical payment ﬂows from and to the German
pension system conditional on the status quo of the year 1957. We therefore ﬁrst
1The method was developed by Auerbach et. al (1991), (1992), and (1994).
2develop a projection method for actual net payment ﬂows between a representa-
tive agent and the German pension system for the actual policy scenario. Only in
a second step, we show how hypothetical payment ﬂows, i.e. payments ﬂows for
the deﬁned-beneﬁt (db) and deﬁned-contribution (dc) scenario, can be calculated
using a slight modiﬁcation of our projection method.
The actual net payments are developed using the projection method generally
applied in generational accounting studies.2 The utilization of this method is
repeated several times for a variety of projection years: Beginning with the year
1957 and continuing with the annual reapplication of the projection for all possible
projection years over the life-cycle of the individual born in 1957.
For this purpose we assume that an agent of cohort 1957 possess all the nec-
essary information to project his “expected” payments to the pension system as
well as his“expected”transfers from the pension scheme on the basis of the status
quo in 1957. He assumes that these payments and receipts are constant for the
rest of his life – except for a growth adjustment, that bases on the actual real
growth rates for the years before 2004 and on a constant real growth rate of 1.5
percent thereafter. In the following new individual (projection) year 1958 the
agent receives new information about the actual values of 1958. With this new
information he adapts his expectation for future payment ﬂows and thus calcu-
lates a new expected rate of return with the information of the bygone year 1957
and the new information of the new projection year 1958. Again, he assumes
that the (growth-adjusted) payments and receipts are constant over the rest of
his life. In doing so, it is obvious that volatility arises for diﬀerent projections
due to varying net payments based on the respective new legal information. For
all years of a cohort (following their birth-year 1957) and their assumed maximal
life-time of one hundred years this procedure yields 100 diﬀerent rates of return
each containing information of the corresponding projection year.
A fundamental restriction serves as a starting point for the projection pay-
ments of type i – in our case i covers the contributions (con) and federal subsidies
(feds) to the pension system as well as the beneﬁts paid by the pension scheme
to existing (exir) and entering retirees (entr) – in the projection year py and in
all other years over the life-cycle s prior to the (individual’s) respective projec-
tion year s ≤ py: The sum of all age-speciﬁc average individual payments ha,i,s,
2For a detailed depiction of this projecting method, see Bonin (2001).
3weighted with the cohort size Pa,s, equals the corresponding macroeconomic ag-
gregate Hi,s – where Hi,s is measured in real value terms of 1957 and the minimum




ha,i,s · Pa,s, (1)
∀ s ≤ py.
As it is impossible or rather too extensive to gather exactly all the payments
between individuals and the pension system satisfying equation (1). Generational
accountants rescale a micro proﬁle ηa,i,s, which captures the relative payment
position of diﬀerent age groups, to the corresponding macroeconomic aggregate
with the help of a rescaling factor
θi,s =
Hi,s P100
a=0 ηa,i,s · Pa,s
, (2)
∀ s ≤ py.
The rescaled age-speciﬁc average individual payments ha,i,s can then easily be
computed by:
ha,i,s = θi,s · ηa,i,s, (3)
∀ s ≤ py.
To project the age speciﬁc individual payments for all years after the respective




(1 + gj), (4)
∀ s > py ∧ i = con,feds,entr.
A slightly diﬀerent approach has to be used to project age-speciﬁc individual
payment ﬂows for beneﬁts paid to existing retirees ha,exir,s. The projection of the
age speciﬁc beneﬁts received by the group of the future existing retirees is based
on the following idea, namely adding up the ﬂow of entering retirees and phasing
out the stock of (then) existing retirees. Thus, the average age-speciﬁc beneﬁts
4for retirees ha,ben,s of age a for all years over the life-cycle s after the respective
projection year py are given by:
ha,ben,s = ha,exir,s = ha−1,exir,s−1 · (1 + gj−1) + ha,entr,s. (5)
In a next step, we compute the annual net beneﬁts which a representative cohort
c receives from the German pension system in all years of remaining life time.
For all the years (s) between the birth year of the cohort (c) and the respective
projection year (py) the annual net beneﬁts nba,s can easily be derived with
equations (1) to (3). For all years (s) after the respective projection year (py)
and the last (potential) year the agent is alive (c+100), the age-speciﬁc payment
ﬂows are given by equations (4) and (5). Hence the net beneﬁt which a cohort
receives from the German pension system is equivalent to the pension beneﬁt
received minus the contribution payments to the pension system, and minus the
share of the public subsidies that are allocated to him:
nbs−c,s = hs−c,ben,s − hs−c,contr,s − hs−c,feds,s, (6)
∀ c ≤ s ≤ c + 100 ∧ s ≥ 1957.
Note that every recalculation of equations (2) to (6) for a new projection year
changes the new underlying data and thus the calculation for the net beneﬁts
(nbs−c,s) in the future (s ≥ py).
After now having developed the actual net beneﬁts, we can derive hypothetical
net beneﬁts on basis of 1957 in order to calculate the db- and dc-scenario. In
order to do so, we need to slightly modify the previous equations (2) to (6): The
aggregates Hi,1957 and the proﬁles for the beneﬁts of existing and entering retirees
ηa,i,1957 (with i = exir and entr) are held constant for all years over the life-cycle,
independent of the respective projection year. Thus, we again use equations
(2) to (6) as well as (7), however, without adjusting the data for the respective
projection year. Hence, the outcome of the hypothetical net beneﬁts under the










∀ c ≤ s ≤ c + 100, s ≥ 1957, ∧ py ≥ 1957.
5Obviously, these net beneﬁts under the information of 1957, nb1957
s−c,s, do not change
with new calculations for diﬀerent projection years as the data is not adjusted.
In the next section we will adjust the net beneﬁts for every projection year
allowing for a db- and a dc-policy.
2.2 Adjusting net beneﬁts for sustainability
In this section we want to adjust the actual net beneﬁts (for py > 2003) as well
as the hypothetical net beneﬁts (for py > 1957) in a way that sustainability
is restored gradually. The result of this is that the annual budget constraint
of the pension system is balanced for the projection year. Note again that the
individual has only information on historical and the current projection year.
For every following projection year, he or she updates information for the new
projection year and assumes the adjusted net beneﬁts of the projection year to
be constant. This update-procedure is recurring for every projection year over
the remaining life-cycle.
The reason for adjusting the hypothetical net beneﬁts is to create a db- and
a dc-policy beginning with the year 1957. In order to apply a db-policy for every
respective projection year e.g., we have to readjust contributions and federal
subsidies for all years s, with s > py > 1957. This assumption generates volatile
hypothetical adjusted net beneﬁts, but note that it covers demography-induced
volatility only. This is an important fact as we later on want to compare the
volatility of the adjusted actual net beneﬁts to the adjusted hypothetical net
beneﬁts.
Adjusting the actual net beneﬁts for all years s, with s > py > 2003, allows us
to consider the implications of the actual policy from the year 2003. We can thus
compare the actual policy over the entire individual’s life-cycle to the db- (dc-)
scenario. The internal rate of return of the individual’s last projection year after
having completed the life-cycle will also be the individual’s ex post sustainable
rate of return. This in turn corresponds to a forecasted internal rate of return of
the German pension system based on the legal status of today.
First of all, we begin with the annual budget constraint of the German pension
system. It quantiﬁes the dimension of the (un)sustainable ﬁnancial situation for
each year. With the knowledge of what was stated above, the unconstrained
budget of German pension system can be expressed as the annual aggregated net
6beneﬁts received by all retirees in a respective year. Hence, the aggregated net
beneﬁts (NBs) in a certain year s can be calculated as the sum of nba,s weighted




nba,s · Pa,s. (8)
In order to obtain the annual age-speciﬁc individual net beneﬁts, nba,s, a general
form of equation (7) must be used:
nba,s = ha,ben,s − ha,contr,s − ha,feds,s. (9)
The ﬁrst thing we now want to consider is the adjustment of the two alternative
scenarios, namely the deﬁned beneﬁt and the deﬁned contribution rule. To do
so, we use the hypothetical net beneﬁts (nb1957
a,s ) developed in the status quo
1957 of the previous section. Due to the assumption that the annual budget
constraint has to be satisﬁed in every projection year, the net beneﬁts of the
respective projection year have to be adjusted. For the db-policy the payments
to the expenditure gap have to be adapted. This is done by introducing a scaling
parameter µj
py which reﬂects the relation of the periodical public liabilities (the
numerator) to contributions and federal subsidies paid in the projection year











For the dc-policy we instead adapt the beneﬁts according the scaling parameter
µdc



















∀ s ≥ py ∧ i =
(
con if k = db
exir,entr if k = dc.
7Thus, the net beneﬁt nb
1957,k
s−c,s that the individual has to pay in and after the
projection years are developed according to the equations (1) to (6) and adjusted
with equations (10) and (12), or (11) and (12), respectively.
We now remain with computing the adjusted actual net payments. The ad-
justments are similar to the standard method of contribution projections for cal-
culations of internal rates of return. The adjustment changes for every projection
year after 2003. Again we have to assure the annual budget is balanced for every
year s > py = 2003. To adjust the actual net beneﬁts, we have to use a modiﬁed
version of equation (10) for all years s > py. In a ﬁrst step, we have to change
the beneﬁts paid to the retirees. The projecting procedure for the age-speciﬁc
individual payments of this type corresponds to equation (4) to (6), only using
the legal deﬁnition of the pension adjustment formula of the year 2004 in order to
conform with today’s policy. In a second step, we adjust the net beneﬁts resulting
from equations (2) to (7) with:
νs =
NBs P100
a=0(ha,con,s + ha,fed,s) · Pa,s
+ 1. (13)
2.3 Calculating internal rates of return
In this chapter we display the internal rates of return for the actual as well as the
hypothetical net beneﬁts. The variation in the rates of return for every projection
year quantiﬁes volatility. Again, the “last” rate of return is the ﬁnal average ex
post interest on the contributions paid.
We ﬁrst compute the present value of the net beneﬁts an individual born
in c receives throughout his whole life PV (nb)py
c . It results from discounting the
annual net beneﬁts to the birth year c with a discount factor (1+r) and weighting
them with the annual survival rate src,s, i.e. the probability that an individual






nbs−c,s · src,s · (1 + r)
c−s. (14)
The internal rate of return is the interest rate that sets equation (14) equal to zero.
So far we have not indicated the underlying projection year, although we know
that the projected individual payments ha,i,s depend on s T py (see equation (3)
and (4)). The projection year of the internal rate of return is now indicated with
8py. We index the actual internal rate of return for the agent born in c, depending
on the respective projection year py, as well as for the policy scenario k. The
index ac stands for the actual policy, and again db for the db-policy, respectively
dc for the dc-policy under the legislation of 1957. The internal rates of return are
solved with an iteration process so that
c+100 X
s=c
nbs−c,s · src,s · (1 + irr
j
c,py)
c−s ≡ 0. (15)
An important characteristic of this internal rate of return irrk
c,py is that it covers all
information of the status quo in the projection year. The individual calculates the
internal rate of return with the past information and only projects the observed
status quo of the respective projection year. Hence, the agent assumes that he will
be confronted with the same age-speciﬁc average transfers as the living entering
retirees of the projection year.
2.4 Bechmarking riskiness
In this section we discuss the volatility of internal rates of return. It is ﬁrst of all
crucial to point out the underlying assumption about the individual’s expectation
as we determine volatility from the individual’s point of view. Here, we assume
that the individual projects his or her rate of return on basis of the actual data,
thus being myopic towards all future development. The individual only observes
the average expenditures for an average entering and existing retiree, as well as
the average contributions and tax payments. Given this information, he ﬁnally
projects them with the real per-capita growth rate. By adapting his projections to
the actual data for every projection year, he is subsequently exposed to volatility
in case the new average observations diﬀer from the projected ones.
We now want to focus on the diﬀerence in volatility in the actual policy
compared to the db- and dc-scenario. Since db and dc pay-as-you-go systems
“automatically react” to the demographic development, we want to propose here
form resulting volatility as benchmark. We are thus comparing the volatility
of the actual policy with either the db- or the dc- scenario. Hence we deﬁne
the riskiness of the German pension system for an individual as the diﬀerence
between the actual and the db- or dc-scenario. It is now to answering the following
question: How big is the risk for an individual in the actual system compared to
9the risk the individual would have faced in case of the implementation of a db-
or dc-system in 1957?
The point is that the individuals now only consider the diﬀerence of volatility
as riskiness. Thus, we assume that the individuals are not shocked by periodical
adjustments due to demographic developments. This means that we relax the
assumption of complete myopia. In contrast to this, any other developments of
the system induce riskiness to the individuals.
3 Calculation and results
3.1 Data
In order to calculate the internal rates of return for the German pension system
the following data is required: population, survival rates, macroeconomic aggre-
gates, age-speciﬁc micro proﬁles of the German pension system, and growth rates,
all of them from the years 1957 up to 2003. Furthermore, a population projection
with the projected survival rates for the future is needed.
Demography
The population data for the past as well as the assumptions for the projections
are taken from the “German Bureau of the Census” (Statistisches Bundesamt).
The past cohort and age-speciﬁc survival rates are available as electronic data
and taken from periodical life tables of the German Bureau of the Census.3 For
the projection of the population and the survival rates we use the assumptions of
the medium variant of the 10th coordinated population projection.45
Aggregates of the German pension system
The time-series of aggregates for the Old L¨ ander starting from the year 1957
3As there are several years only with abridged period life-tables – for the years before the
abridged life-table 1979/1981 the electronically published life-tables are only available in a ten-
years-interval – we develop the missing period life-tables, i.e. survival rates, by adjusting the
published data linearly.
4The calculation method of the projection is based on Bonin (2001) and calculated with the
cohort component method proposed by Leslie (1945).
5The projected old-age dependency ratio – individuals aged over 60 in relation to the 20
to 59 year-olds – amounts to 0.45 in the year 2003, rises only slightly up to 0.49 in 2015 and
increasing steadily to 0.77 in the year 2058. We use this ratio as approximation for the ratio of
retirees to labor force.
10and the New L¨ ander beginning from the year 1991 are published by the “As-
sociation of German Retirement Insurance Organizations” (Verband Deutscher
Rentenversicherungstr¨ ager) in VDR (2004). The corresponding budget is com-
posed as follows: The revenues of the German pension system are roughly split
into age-speciﬁc contributions and federal subsidies.6 In the year 2003, the con-
tributions made up about 73 percent and the subsidies about 26 percent of the
revenues in Germany. The share of subsidies was the same in the year 1957 but
decreased to 15.4 percent in the year 1973 to increase again. The largest part
of all expenditures in 2003 were the pension expenditures with 89 percent. In
the past, the overall expenditures expressed as GDP ratio raised from about 6.5
percent in the 1957 to 11.1 percent in the year 2003.
In line with our method, we need to split up the aggregates and calculate the
share of pension expenditures to entering retirees. We do this by multiplying the
average pension expenditure for an entering retiree with the respective amount
of entering retirees.7 The residual amount is distributed to the existing retirees.
Furthermore, we proportionally add up all other expenditures of the German
pension system to the pension expenditures for existing and entering retirees.8
Note that there is a special treatment for the development of the federal
subsidies. The legal status quo assumes that the aggregate of the federal sub-
sidies – not considering the so called “additional federal subsidies” (zus¨ atzlicher
Bundeszuschuss) – increases with the per-capita real growth rate and rises with
increasing contributions. Thus, the per-capita payment increases more than pro-
portional to the per-capita contributions in the case of Germany, i.e. we have a
decreasing tax base and increasing retirees. As a lower bound and probably as a
more realistic long-term scenario for the development of the federal subsidies, we
assume that the federal subsidies increase according to the development of the
tax base and the contribution rate. Thus, the per-capita payments increase with
6In addition to this there is a small share of further revenues, namely refunding and other
revenues, which are added to the subsidies as well as a small share of non age-speciﬁc wealth
returns, which we are not considering.
7This data is also published in VDR (2004).
8The individuals also receive health- and long-term-care beneﬁts, both ranging about seven
percent , as well as a small share of child-rearing beneﬁts. A small share of refunds for contri-
butions as well as an amount of beneﬁts for participation at working life remain, which however
we do not consider here.
11the per-capita growth rate and the increase of the contribution rate.
Determining age- and sex-speciﬁc proﬁles
Before projecting the rescaled per capita net payments, we need to distribute the
aggregates on age-speciﬁc proﬁles per-capita of the population. Before doing so,
the following step of empirical work is needed: Age-speciﬁc proﬁles per capita of
the population (θi,s, see equation (3)) are obtained by modifying the respective
raw age-speciﬁc micro data. This is done by multiplying the raw micro data with
the ratio of the relevant people (e.g. entering retirees) to the total population of
the respective age. We can now simply calculate the age- and sex-speciﬁc proﬁles
by extending the method onto males and females and their proﬁles, respectively.9
Thus, we rescale eight diﬀerent age- and sex-speciﬁc raw proﬁles with the four
types of aggregates.
The raw contribution proﬁles and the amount of contributors are published
by the Association of German Retirement Insurance Organizations since the year
1984. Contrary to the ordinary earnings proﬁles, the diﬀerence between the male
and female contribution-proﬁle is smaller. The reason for this is the fact that the
“income threshold” (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) in the German pension system
simply caps the higher incomes of the males.10
The federal subsidies are distributed with a constant mix of proﬁles: half
sales and half income taxes – which approximately meets the share of direct and
indirect taxes. These are obtained from the German Income and Expenditure
Survey (“Einkommens- und Verbrauchsstichprobe 1993”).
Last, we need raw age- and sex-speciﬁc proﬁles and the quantity of entering
and existing retirees in order to develop the expenditure side. All are published
annually by the Association of German Retirement Insurance Organizations. The
volumes for the existing retirees were published by the “Federal Minister for La-
bor” (Bundesministerium f¨ ur Arbeit) before 1984.11 These age- and sex-speciﬁc
proﬁles consist of average pensions of both insurance classes (workers and em-
9See Bonin (2001) for a more detailed set-up.
10Because micro data on contributions is available only starting from the year 1984 we hold
the proﬁles constant for the years before.
11The proﬁles for existing retirees are only available in ﬁve-year age-groups before 1984. We
adjust them linearly. The proﬁles for entering retirees are obtained with annual age groups.
12ployees) and all the pension types.12
Projection of net payments
Finally, we need the real growth rates of the past periods as well as an assumed
growth rate for the years after 2003. In line with the assumptions of the so called
“R¨ urup-Commission”we take a real growth rate of 1.5 percent.13
Since we do not address the risk aspect to growth development, we assume
that the individual has information about all real growth rates until 2003. The
time-series of the growth of the average per-capita gross payments for workers and
employees are taken from VDR (2004). The consumer-price index to deﬂate the
growth rates and aggregates are released by the “German Council of Economic
Advisors”(Sachverst¨ andigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen En-
twicklung). The per-capita contributions and federal subsidies to the German
pension system for the future are projected with the respective growth rate and
adjusted according to section 2.2 after 2003.14 The per-capita expenditures de-
pend on the actual pension adjustment formula for entering and existing retirees
in case of the actual policy. We thus account for the so called “modiﬁed gross-
wage adjustment” and the sustainability factor both reﬂecting the latest reform
measures introduced.15
3.2 Sustainable internal rates of return
In this chapter we depict the sustainable internal rates of return of diﬀerent
cohorts under the actual policy. They are to be interpreted as projected ex post
internal rates of return realized at the end of the individuals’ life-cycle. We brieﬂy
want to relate our calculations to the rates of return calculated in the literature.
Common scenario-based approaches in the literature often use the unrealistic
scenario of a standard retiree (“Eckrentner”) with 45 years of annual average
income history using the regular retirement path at the age of 65. In contrast
to this we – apart from contributions – consider federal subsidies ﬁnanced via
taxation and all expenditures of the German pension system for an average male
12One exception is the orphan’s pension as there is no age-speciﬁc data for the earlier volumes.
13See Kommission f¨ ur die Nachhaltigkeit der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003).
14This yields a contribution rate of percent 24.55 percent in 2050.
15See Kommission f¨ ur die Nachhaltigkeit der Sozialen Sicherungssysteme (2003) for a detailed
discussion.
13and female agent. Besides additional expenditures included in the diﬀerent budget
positions, we especially account for all diﬀerent kinds of paths into retirement.
We furthermore extend the analysis to non-insurance credits (e.g. education and
child rearing). We develop the per-capita payments with age- and sex-speciﬁc
proﬁles per capita of the population and the aggregates. Thus, we do not relate
the individual payments of a contributor over the life-cycle to his claims of pension
beneﬁts. This is certainly a diﬀerence to the standard scenario-based approaches.
On the other hand, this method is necessary to include on average all possible
cases if individual eligibility. Thus, as already indicated, we can include federal
subsidies and non-insurance covered beneﬁts.
Our calculations are done with stochastic survival rates. But we do not use
stochastic probabilities for other possible events of life-risks, e.g. disability, sur-
vival of spouse, probabilities to receive diﬀerent non-insurance credits. In this
respect we may have a setback concerning these risk categories.
Figure 1: Sustainable internal rates of return for diﬀerent cohorts –
actual policy
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Figure 1 shows the sustainable internal rates of return for diﬀerent cohorts.
The rate of return decreases from 1.4 percent (for the male cohort 1940 assuming
a real growth rate of 1.5 percent) and reaches zero for all cohorts after 2000. In
14contrast to the rates of return for the males, the internal rates of return for the
women remain positiv: The female cohort of 1940 starts oﬀ with an internal rate
of return of 3.9 percent which decreases to 2.1 percent for the female cohorts of
2010.
The reason for the higher rates of return for females is that they pay a lower
share of contributions and federal subsidies ﬁnanced via taxation and mainly paid
by men. However, they in average receive e.g. almost all the pensions for survivors
and credits for child-rearing. Hence, we get a disparity between ﬁnancing and
receiving non-insurance covered beneﬁts with an increasing contribution rate in
the future. Furthermore, we see for both males and females that the substantial
higher contribution rates in the 1990s and the following reforms in the beginning
of 2000 reduce the rates of return notably for all cohorts born after 1940. The
other half of the reduction in rates of return in comparison to the cohort 2010
proceeds gradually through the sustainability factor and the higher contributions
and federal subsidies. It is important to see that the increase in life-expectancy of
younger cohorts does not compensate the cuts. Figure 1 also shows that we have
substantial negative rates of return for younger males in case of a smaller future
real growth than 1.5 percent. In the (pessimistic) scenario of zero real growth we
see that this lack in growth may induce the major negative impact for younger
and future cohorts.
3.3 The volatility of the internal rates of return
In this section we want to quantify the volatility of the internal rates of return
of the German pension system. Therefore we analyze the development of the
internal rate of return from an ex ante perspective at the birth of an individual.
We choose the cohort born in the year 1957 because the birth-year of this cohort is
equivalent to the year of the implementation of the wage-indexed German public
pension scheme. The cohort 1957 is the ﬁrst one fully exposed to the“new”social
security system after World War II. This volatility can be seen as upper bound for
younger cohorts from today’s level of information. The riskiness may change with
further changes of the status quo in the future. The older cohorts are exposed to
similar risk but since they partly face the existing system before 1957, which is
not examined here, we can not compare them.
In Figure 2 we depict the rates of return for the male and female cohort for
15every projection year and for the diﬀerent policy scenarios: actual policy, dc-
policy, and db-policy. In this section we will focus on the male cohort as all the
changes are similar but lower for the female cohort (see Figure 1).
Figure 2: The volatility of the rates of return for the cohort 1957
(with 1.5 percent real growth rate)







































We are thus able to show that there is only a slight diﬀerence between the db-
and dc-policy in the last ﬁve decades, i.e. the ﬁrst 47 years of the individual’s
life-cycle. The reason for this is that adjustments induced by demographics are
relative small in this period or rather the rate of return responds in the same way
as long as the individual is still a contributor (which was the case). However,
there is a substantial diﬀerence between both scenarios and the actual policy,
which directly leads to the ﬁrst main result of the paper: There is a substantial
diﬀerence in their internal rate of return of actual policy compared to the dc-
or db-policy. This diﬀerence is due to a multitude of legislative changes and re-
sponses in retirement behavior of the individuals instead of having an indefeasible
rule as in the dc- or db-scenario. Both alternative scenarios allow only the retire-
ment facts and behavior of the year 1957. Thus the “expected” rate of return of
the individual obviously changes less than in the actual scenario.
16Another interesting point is that the rates of return for all three scenarios
are almost similar in the beginning of the 1960s and return to be similar in
the beginning of the 1990s. This means that the cohort 1957 would have been
better oﬀ by assuming the status quo of the German pension policy at their
birth to be constant. The diﬀerence of the actual scenario and the db- or dc-
scenario in the period between the beginning of the 1960s and 1990s, as shown
in Figure 1, displays a substantial risk of the system for the individuals. This
is the case because the German pension policy is characterized by permanently
changing degree of generosity. Periods of excessive windfalls to the retirees result
in phases of massive consolidation by rising contributions and/or redemption of
the beneﬁt level. Finally, the period of the 1990s shows the impact of the German
reuniﬁcation and the rising demographic pressure for all three scenarios.
For illustrative purposes we want to mention some major changes in the Ger-
man pension expenditure chronologically. These give an intuition for the changes
of the actual internal rate of return as depicted in Figure 2. It is important to
mention that there are also lagged reactions of the individuals to legal changes
aﬀecting the actual internal rate of return.
In the 1960s (i) an increasing share of credits for times spent in war, (ii) higher
credits for education, as well as (iii) an increasing participation to the pension
system all increased the rate of return. These beneﬁt extensions are followed
by a rising contribution rate of 14 percent in 1965 to 17 percent in 1970. In the
beginning of the 1970s a major pension reform introduced more generous rules for
diverse paths of early retirement and, among other things, minimum pensions.
Again this reform was followed by cuts in the internal rate of return due to a
changed and capped indexation of the pension adjustment formula at the end
of the 1970s. In the beginning of the 1980s early retirement for pensions due
to incapability to work was introduced. This was followed again by cuts of the
internal rate of return due to increasing contribution rates from 18 percent in
1982 to 19.2 percent in the year 1986. In the following years the contribution rate
decreased to 17.5 percent in 1993 but blew up to 19.2 percent in 1994 due to the
German reuniﬁcation.16 Furthermore the federal subsidies increased signiﬁcantly
16The German Uniﬁcation imposes a ﬁnancial compensation of about 2.5 percent in the year
2003 on the West German contribution and tax payer. West Germany usually runs a surplus
which is partly used to ﬁnance the deﬁcit in East Germany. Note, however, that due to a severe
east-west migration, a substantial number of West-German contribution payers are in fact of
East-German origin, that is the regional redistribution can not be seen as a burden posed by
17in the 1990s. Finally deductions for early retirement in the beginning of 2000
reduced the rate of return.
The period after 2003 is then dominated by adjustments due to the modiﬁed-
gross indexation and the sustainability factor. On the one hand, it should be
emphasized that the indexation – in contrast to the dc-scenario – does not burden
the cohort 1957 with the full costs of demographic transition. On the other hand
the actual policy and dc-policy converge towards almost similar rates of return for
the male cohort of 1957. A high diﬀerence exists between the db-policy and the
other policies, i.e. the actual and the dc-policy. It arises because the 1957-born
individual is almost not aﬀected to adjustments due to demographic transition in
the db-policy. At this point it is important to mention that we do not consider the
impact of uncertainty of diﬀerent macroeconomic variables on the optimal design
of social security schemes. This means that for our purpose we do not need
to favor any of the two alternative adjustment rules, e.g. deﬁned-contribution
or deﬁned-beneﬁt. We rather specify a corridor of riskiness. Depending on the
optimal choice of the dc- or db-policy, the riskiness amounts in the diﬀerence
between the actual and the dc- or db-policy, respectively.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of internal rate of returns
Male cohort 1957
actual policy dc-policy db-policy
Max 4.67 3.1 3.1
Min 0.46 0.47 2.07
Standard deviation 1.38 0.95 0.30
Female cohort 1957
actual policy dc policy db-policy
Max 5.66 4.42 4.42
Min 2.63 2.11 3.64
Standard deviation 0.96 0.81 0.19
Table 1 shows the standard deviation of the actual policy and the diﬀerent
scenarios. We ﬁnd that policy changes in the past and future impose a substantial
risk on the individual’s actual calculated rates of return compared to the db- or
dc-policy. The standard deviation in the actual scenario is about 0.4 (3.5) times
higher than in the dc- (db-) policy for males. The volatility of the female cohort
born in 1957 is slightly lower. The standard deviation of the actual policy is
about 0.15 (3.25) times higher than in the dc- (db-) policy.
East Germans to their Western counterparts.
18Another important ﬁnding is the minimum value of the internal rate of return.
It corresponds to the sustainable internal rate of return in the previous section
since the last value of the life-cycle is the lowest. The minimum value of the
actual policy is almost similar (close) to the dc-policy for males (females). The
sustainable rate of return of the db-policy is higher for males and females. We
take this a starting point for a calculation of sustainable rates of return of all the
three policies for diﬀerent cohorts of an average individual.
Figure 3: Sustainable internal rates of return for diﬀerent cohorts -
actual vs. dc- and db-policy



































Figure 3 shows the results and leads to a summarization of the discussion in
the last two subsections. It shows that sustainable internal rates of return are
higher than the actual policy under both alternative scenarios, namely deﬁned-
contribution and deﬁned-beneﬁt policy, for the cohorts born after 1990. This
means that the actual policy induces lower rates of return for the youngest and
future cohorts and imposes a substantial volatility on individuals shown exem-
plarily for the cohort 1957.
194 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the development of the German pension system in terms
of internal rates of return by constructing a projection method for their calcula-
tion.
The main issue of this paper is the risk, to which individuals in the German
pension system are exposed. Assuming a myopic individual born in 1957, we show
that the volatility of rates of return is between 0.4 and 3.5 times higher for males
and 0.15 and 3.25 times higher for females than in a deﬁned-contribution or de-
ﬁned beneﬁt scenario based on the status quo of 1957. This is a remarkable result:
If the German pension system would have been designed as deﬁned-contribution
or deﬁned-beneﬁt rule rather than the actual discretionary policy, the risk would
be signiﬁcant lower. Furthermore, when discussing risk issues concerning private
capital-based provisions for old-age, one should not neglect the riskiness public
pension system may bring along for individuals.
An important byproduct of this study is the calculation of sustainable rates of
return including federal subsidies and non-insurance covered beneﬁts. We show
that the sustainable rates of return are close to zero for the youngest and future
male cohorts and positive for females for optimistic growth scenarios. This can
be explained as follows: Males are burdened by a higher share of taxes which are
adjusted during demographic transition. In contrast to this however, the non-
insurance covered beneﬁts do not rise during demographic transition. In other
words, the neglecting of non-insurance covered beneﬁts and federal subsidies for
the calculations of net beneﬁts simply leads to an overestimation of internal rates
of return especially for male cohorts. If real growth rates are lower things will
turn worse. Furthermore the calculations reveal ex post sustainable internal rates
of return under the deﬁned-contribution or deﬁned-beneﬁt system that are at all
events higher than the actual rates of return for an average individual younger
than the cohort 1990.
Summing up it can be said that a deﬁned-contribution or deﬁned-beneﬁt policy
induces substantially less volatility on the exemplary 1957 born individual than
the actual policy does and the rates of return are higher for the youngest and
future cohorts. But what it comes down to is that besides the youngest and
future cohorts even older cohorts may prefer a deﬁned-contribution or a deﬁned-
beneﬁt policy. This is due to the fact that they would be confronted with a
substantial lower volatility under an indefeasible rule.
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